FROM BATSARI TO ORIIRE: The Evolution of Banditry, the South-West Model, and the Case for Community-Rooted Security |Aderogba Adebayo Taofik, mni

FROM BATSARI TO ORIIRE: The Evolution of Banditry, the South-West Model, and the Case for Community-Rooted Security // Aderogba Adebayo Taofik, mni

Batsari is where soldiers trained not to weep are moved to tears. Jibia is where a mother folds an empty uniform as though it still held her son. In Katsina, 52 schools are locked, and children recognise the sound of motorcycles before they can spell. These are not statistics; they mark the collapse of the social contract.

This crisis cannot be addressed by blaming Abuja alone. Understanding its origins, the South-West’s distinct response, and the warning from Oriire shows why Nigeria needs a community-rooted, intelligence-driven security system.

The Origins of Banditry in Northern Nigeria

Banditry in Nigeria is longstanding. Its roots reach back to the trans-Saharan trade routes through Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto, where armed groups ambushed caravans from hilltops such as Kwatarkwashi and Chafe. The first recorded large-scale colonial-era attack occurred in 1901, when assailants attacked a grain caravan and killed 210 merchants on the Hausa-Niger border.

Although banditry has deep historical roots, its contemporary form emerged from a modern combination of agrarian conflict, weak institutions, criminal organisation, and access to weapons. Its development can be understood in four phases:

Phase One – The Agrarian Crisis (1980s-2009): For nearly four decades, unresolved disputes between settled farmers and nomadic herders intensified across the North-West. Population growth, desertification, and the clearance of grazing reserves displaced pastoral communities, particularly in Maru and Zurmi LGAs of Zamfara, where Fulani hamlets had existed for more than 500 years. Corrupt district heads, police extortion, and compromised local courts deepened the grievances of an increasingly dispossessed population.

Phase Two – Criminal Consolidation (2011-2014): Banditry escalated after the 2011 general elections. Reprisal cattle rustling associated with figures such as Buhari Daji, known as Buhari of the bush, developed into organised violence. Yan Sakai vigilante groups, initially supplied with motorcycles by the Zamfara government, came to be viewed through an ethnic lens: Hausa vigilantes against Fulani herders. Law enforcement gave way to communal vendetta, while the collapse of Libya in 2011 flooded the Sahel with small arms and gave these groups firepower beyond the state’s capacity.

Phase Three – Industrialization of Kidnapping (2015-2021): Operating from forests in Zamfara, motorcycle-borne gangs expanded their raids into Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, and Katsina. Banditry had already reached the seven Katsina LGAs bordering Zamfara by 2010: Jibia, Batsari, Safana, Danmusa, Kankara, Faskari, and Sabuwa. During this phase, the dominant model shifted from cattle rustling to kidnapping for ransom—a transactional, profit-driven crime without the ideological character of Boko Haram. Mass abductions of schoolchildren became its most profitable signature.

Phase Four – Southern Migration: Today, banditry seeks new forests and weaker governance. That is why Ondo, Ekiti, Ogun and Oyo have intensified border surveillance following the killing of an ISWAP commander in Owo forest. The criminals move freely across forests while government response remains fragmented.

The South-West Approach: A Different Philosophy

While the North-West oscillated between military bombardment and failed dialogue, the South-West, in January 2020, chose a subsidiarity model.

Led by the late Governor Rotimi Akeredolu, the six South-West states established the Western Nigeria Security Network, Operation Amotekun, to complement the police, DSS and Civil Defence. Its doctrine is fundamentally different:

1. Hybrid Policing: Amotekun is not a conventional force. Research from Obafemi Awolowo University describes it as hybrid policing, where state and non-state actors — hunters, local vigilantes, retired officers — collaborate, using terrain knowledge and community intelligence. As one analysis notes, in asymmetric warfare, the person who understands the terrain becomes more valuable than the person with the biggest weapon.
2. Proactive Interdiction: Unlike reactive deployment, Amotekun has adopted stop-and-search interdiction, intercepting trailers concealing over 100 able-bodied men under cattle and dismantled motorcycles, described by its commander as invasion of the South-West.
3. Coordinated Intelligence: The six states now share intelligence through the Development Agenda for Western Nigeria (DAWN) Commission, with Amotekun commanders and security advisers meeting jointly, monitoring borders with Kogi, Kwara and others. It also advocates joint checkpoints and an integrated forest surveillance architecture with drones, seismic sensors and community forest guards.

It is not perfect — academic studies note funding, legal and coordination challenges — but it reduced selected crimes because security personnel are familiar with the communities where they operate.

Oriire: When the North’s Tragedy Came to Yorubaland

On May 15, 2026, at about 8-9am, armed men invaded Ahoro-Esiele community in Oriire Local Government Area of Oyo State. They stormed three schools simultaneously: Baptist Nursery and Primary School in Yawota, Community Grammar School in Esiele, and L.A. Primary School.

They abducted 39 pupils, 7 teachers and one toddler, and shot a teacher. One of the abducted teachers, Michael Oyedokun, was beheaded, with a graphic video circulated online. Another teacher, John Olaleye, was also confirmed killed, with fellow victims recovering their bodies.

What followed was one of the longest school abductions in South-Western history — 56 days in captivity. The kidnappers demanded N1 billion ransom paid into a Republic of Benin account, Hilux vehicles, and even implementation of Sharia law in Oyo State. Federal government later charged three suspects from Suleja, Niger State, alleging affiliation with Ansaru, a proscribed terrorist group.

The victims were eventually rescued on July 10, 2026, through a coordinated operation involving the military, DSS and police that arrested eight abductors and neutralized others without collateral damage. Teachers recounted surviving on rice, seasoning cubes and salt twice daily, without pepper, for seven weeks.

Oriire means “good fortune” in Yoruba, but that day brought only despair. It proved that the forest corridor linking Old Oyo National Park, Kogi and Kwara is no longer a buffer — it is a highway.

Solutions and Implementation Strategies: Beyond Blaming Abuja

We cannot blame Abuja while palaces negotiate with bandits and governors politicize security. The solution must be multi-layered, as Afenifere itself has urged: robust military action, tighter border control, community policing and elimination of economic incentives for kidnapping.

1. Institutionalize the South-West Model Nationally:

•⁠ ⁠Action: Legalize State Police. Amotekun’s Council of Commanders has already declared support for it as the only viable solution. Amend the 1999 Constitution to move policing to the concurrent list.
•⁠ ⁠Implementation: Within 90 days, Oyo State should enact a Forest Security Corps Law integrating Amotekun, hunters and Fulani Miyetti Allah vigilantes who pass integrity vetting. Establish a Joint South-West Operational Command with shared database, drone docking stations and night-vision equipment, funded by a 1% security levy on state internally generated revenue.

2. Forest Dominance, Not Forest Clearance:

•⁠ ⁠Action: Stop reactive bush burning. Adopt weather-informed patrols using rainfall and vegetation cover forecasts to predict concealment risk.
•⁠ ⁠Implementation: Map and cut access roads through Old Oyo National Park and Oriire-Ikoyi forest reserves. Deploy solar-powered cameras and employ 500 youth per LGA as forest guards with GPS trackers, as recommended in recent studies.

3. Dismantle the Ransom Economy:

•⁠ ⁠Action: Kidnapping persists because it pays. A serious crackdown on ransom payments, including tracing cryptocurrency ransoms, would remove financial incentive.
•⁠ ⁠Implementation: National Assembly must pass the Ransom Prohibition Act with mandatory 15-year sentence for ransom facilitators. CBN should mandate NIN-linked BVN verification for any transfer above N50,000 to Benin, Niger, and other border accounts. The Oriire demand for payment into a Benin account must never recur.

4. School Security Redesign:

•⁠ ⁠Action: 52 schools cannot remain locked. President Tinubu already charged Oyo to ensure adequate security around schools.
•⁠ ⁠Implementation: Immediate fencing and deployment of two Amotekun + one police per public school in Oriire, Ogbomoso zone. Install community early-warning whistles and dedicated GSM hotlines. Relocate schools within 5km of known forest reserves and provide secure boarding.

5. Justice and Traditional Institution Reform:

•⁠ ⁠Action: End the era where traditional rulers collude with bandits or where district heads extort herders. As the history shows, this collusion dates to Dansadau in 1891.
•⁠ ⁠Implementation: Oyo State Council of Obas must create a Security Accountability Committee. Any Baale or chief found warning bandits or collecting levies faces deposition and prosecution under Terrorism Prevention Act.

Batsari taught us that soldiers cry when intelligence fails. Jibia taught us that uniforms come home empty when leadership fails. Oriire has now taught the South-West that no wall is high enough when forests are ungoverned.

The choice is no longer between dialogue and bombardment. It is between a hybrid, community-rooted, intelligence-driven security system and continued lamentation in palaces while children learn to run instead of read.

About the Author: Comrade Aderogba Adebayo Taofik, mni, is a unionist in the food, beverage, and tobacco industry, with professional expertise in logistics and supply chains. He is also a policy research and public affairs analyst, an advocate for good governance, and a chieftain of the Oyo APC. He writes from Ward 12, Ibadan North Federal Constituency, Oyo State, Nigeria.